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STRICT IN THEORY, LOOPY IN FACT
Nathaniel Persily*†
Most Supreme Court-watchers find the decision in LULAC v. Perry notable for the ground it breaks concerning Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and the ground it refuses to break on the topic of partisan gerrymandering. I
tend to think the Court’s patchwork application of Section 2 to strike down a
district on vote dilution grounds is not all that dramatic, nor is its resolution
of the partisan gerrymandering claims all that surprising. The truly unprecedented development in the case for me was Justice Scalia’s vote to uphold
what he considered a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause,
but one that survived strict scrutiny. This essay tries to explain why his opinion is important, both in its own right and with respect to its implications for
how he might consider the upcoming challenges to the newly reauthorized
Voting Rights Act.
As an initial matter, though, it should be clear that Scalia’s opinion
represents a milestone for him. Never before has he concluded that a law
otherwise violates the Equal Protection Clause, but nevertheless survives
because it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Previously, in City of Richmond v. Croson, he had suggested that “[a]t least where
state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of
imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison race riot, requiring
temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an exception to the principle
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” Indeed, even
in the one case he has considered involving segregation of prisoners for their
own safety, Johnson v. California, he joined Justice Thomas’s opinion,
which applied a lower standard of review to uphold the practice given the
deference ordinarily due prison officials.
To appreciate the significance of the move in his thinking it is important
to understand the nature of the constitutional challenge Justice Scalia rejects. The plaintiffs launched an equal protection challenge to Texas
Congressional District 25, which strung together counties from Austin to the
Mexico border and grouped what Justice Kennedy later determined to be
two “far-flung” culturally distinct Hispanic communities. The plaintiffs’
claim drew on the rule established in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, in which
the Court made clear that a district that was “unexplainable on grounds
other than race” or “predominantly based on race” triggered strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause and would ordinarily fail. In some of
*
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
†
Suggested citation: Nathaniel Persily, Strict in Theory, Loopy in Fact, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. First Impressions 43 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/
persily.pdf.

43

PERSILY FINAL.DOC

44

8/28/2006 6:04 PM

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 105:43

those cases, however, the Court (which usually meant Justice O’Connor or
Justice Kennedy) had left open the possibility that a racially predominant
district could pass strict scrutiny if it was narrowly tailored to avoid a Voting
Rights Act violation. The Court has never issued an opinion finding a district that would pass this test, although in King v. State Board of Elections it
summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding the infamous Chicago
ear-muff district as narrowly tailored to avoid a Section 2 violation.
In creating District 25 the legislature attempted to further the partisan
goals of the gerrymander while avoiding a violation of the Voting Rights
Act. Because the plan removed 100,000 Hispanics from District 23 in order
to shore up the seat for Republican Congressman Henry Bonilla, it therefore
increased the number of Hispanics in District 25 (Lloyd Doggett’s district)
to keep the number of majority-minority districts constant in the plan and
avoid a voting rights violation. (To be precise, Bonilla’s district was majority-minority, just not when evaluated according to citizen voting age
population.) The district court found that the creation of District 25 offset
any potential voting rights liability created by District 23, and in any event,
the predominant motive of the legislature in creating the district was partisan, not racial. Chief Justice Roberts’s cogent separate opinion in LULAC
explains why the district court was right.
Although the State’s principal argument in the Supreme Court was that
District 25 was drawn for partisan reasons, Justice Scalia nevertheless found
the district triggered strict scrutiny. In his mind, “when a legislature intentionally creates a majority-minority district, race is necessarily its
predominant motivation and strict scrutiny is therefore triggered.” Unlike
any other district Justice Scalia had previously considered, though, this district passed strict scrutiny because it was necessary to avoid liability under
Section 5. His opinion raises two big questions: (1) why does Justice Scalia
think compliance with Section 5 represents a compelling state interest, and
(2) why was District 25 narrowly tailored to serve that interest?
There are three reasons, it seems, why Justice Scalia believes compliance with Section 5 is a compelling state interest. First, he relies on
precedent, echoing his opinion in Tennessee v. Lane, in which he suggested
that for the sake of stare decisis he would relax his review of the strictures
of congressional power when race was involved. He cites the Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, emphasizing that “[w]e long ago
upheld the constitutionality of § 5.” Second, although he admits in a footnote that no party in these cases raised an as-applied constitutional
challenge to Section 5 and he assumes its constitutionality, he describes Section 5 in almost glowing terms as legislation that uses race “to remedy
identified past discrimination” and “applies only to jurisdictions with a history of official discrimination.” Besides the race riot examples, Justice
Scalia had always clung to the view that narrow race-conscious remedies for
individual victims of discrimination could be constitutional. Third, he argues that Section 5 must be a compelling state interest because, if it were
not, “then a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to
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choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.”
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the precedential importance of the Court’s
decisions in upholding Section 5 and the historic justification for the statute
is relevant for how he might consider constitutional challenges to the newly
reauthorized Voting Rights Act. Although the rationale for continuing coverage only of the particular jurisdictions captured by Section 5 is weaker
today than it was in 1965, perhaps Justice Scalia’s opinion here suggests he
will look the other way and not apply the kind of strict interpretation suggested by his other opinions considering the scope of Congress’s power
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course,
given changes to the law made in this reauthorization (e.g., overturning
Georgia v. Ashcroft and Reno v. Bossier Parish II) he probably will find
Congress went too far this time or that the coverage formula is no longer
congruent to the class of jurisdictions with a history of official discrimination. That being said, his effusive description of Section 5’s purposes and
precedent is quite remarkable.
His argument about the forced choice jurisdictions would face if Section
5 were not a compelling interest, however, goes strongly against the grain of
his prior opinions. The idea that mere compliance with a federal statute
somehow immunizes otherwise unconstitutional state action seems a strange
move for Scalia to make (to put it mildly). Surely, the state’s defense that “it
was only following orders” or that the “devil (i.e., federal government) made
me do it” would not allow the state, for instance, to segregate schools or ban
interracial marriage. Either the antidiscrimination and remedial justifications
for the state’s construction of this district are compelling or they are not, but
the federal government’s coercion of the state should not factor into the calculus. Suppose Congress used its Enforcement Clause power to require
states to set aside ten percent of the spaces in its public universities for minority applicants or give preferences for minority contractors—would an
otherwise unconstitutional quota or preference enforced by the state now be
constitutional? The implication here is that the presence of a federal law
cures the constitutional defect in the district, and conversely, if the law were
to expire, such a district would then be unconstitutional.
The problems with the analysis are compounded by the evaluation of
whether the district was narrowly tailored to avoid retrogression under Section 5. Drawing on the Court’s decision in the later Shaw cases, Justice
Scalia suggests the Court ought to ask whether there was a “strong basis in
evidence” for the state to believe the construction of such a district was
“reasonably necessary” under the Act. He notes that a state has great flexibility to comply with the Act, per Ashcroft, which allows states to choose
the proper balance of influence districts and majority-minority districts. Because he reads the appellants as conceding that the creation of another
majority-minority district was necessary to avoid Section 5 liability, he decides the racially discriminatory district is narrowly tailored.
From reading this opinion one would think that the State struggled to
find a way out of the dilemma between a voting rights or constitutional
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violation and that the contours of District 25 were therefore a necessary evil.
In fact, the State placed itself in that bind when it decided to improve the
reelection prospects of a Republican Congressman (Bonilla) instead of
keeping the district as the federal court had drawn it in 2001. The alleged
“need” to offset the decline in the Hispanic population of District 23 by creating a new majority-minority district arose simply because the State was
unwilling to keep the current lines in place and risk losing a Republican
seat. District 25 is only “necessary” once the decision is made to protect
Bonilla’s district; it is only “narrowly tailored” if the State has a compelling
interest to avoid Section 5 liability while also shoring up an incumbent’s
electoral prospects.
Contrast this approach with the stand taken in Justice Thomas’s dissent
(joined by Scalia) and voiced by Justice Scalia in the oral argument in the
Michigan Law School affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger. There
the State made the argument that it had a compelling interest in achieving a
racially diverse student body while also maintaining an elite and selective
law school. Affirmative action was necessary under this view, because the
school could not otherwise maintain its high admission standards and
achieve a racially diverse student body. As Justice Thomas described the
goals of the law school’s affirmative action program, “[t]he interest in remaining elite and exclusive that the majority thinks so obviously critical
requires the use of admissions ‘standards’ that, in turn, create the Law
School’s ‘need’ to discriminate on the basis of race.” He concludes, however, that “[u]nless each constituent part of this state interest is of pressing
public necessity, the Law School’s use of race is unconstitutional,” and “the
Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and
its exclusionary admissions system—it cannot have it both ways.”
The situation in LULAC is parallel, but even less justifiable. Whereas the
decision to have an elite law school required the use of a racial classification
to achieve racial diversity simultaneously, here the decision to protect an
incumbent forces the state to impose a racial classification to comply with
the Voting Rights Act. Even assuming incumbent protection is an interest
comparable to having an elite law school, leaving the districts as they were
and risking Bonilla’s seat obviously would have been a more narrowly tailored way of achieving compliance with the Act.
Furthermore, even if the State wanted to fulfill both goals—incumbent
protection and Voting Rights Act compliance—it had a multitude of options
before it that did not give rise to the same Shaw-related concerns present in
District 25. As Justice Scalia references in his invocation of Ashcroft, the
State did not need to create an additional majority-minority district to comply with Section 5. After subtracting the 100,000 Hispanics from Henry
Bonilla’s district, it could have created other more compact influence districts, probably without even intentionally doing so on the basis of race. He
takes shelter under the appellants’ self-serving concession that an additional
effective Latino district was necessary to comply with Section 5, but we
know Justice Scalia disagrees with that concession given his position in
Ashcroft.
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None of this critique of Justice Scalia’s opinion should be taken as criticizing the ultimate destination he reaches, namely the upholding of the
Texas gerrymander. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts explains why that might
be the correct result and reasonable people can disagree about the various
claims of partisan gerrymandering and voting rights violations. What
Scalia’s resolution of LULAC shows is that even the most ardent advocate of
a color-blindness approach to equal protection must bend his principles
when it comes to redistricting. Racial considerations inevitably play a role
in the redistricting process, whether or not the Voting Rights Act forces the
construction of districts of particular racial percentages and whether or not
the census building blocks of redistricting plans continue to come primarily
with racial data attached. With the move of each piece of geography from
one district to another, linedrawers are aware of the race-based implications
of their decisions. Each move represents the expression of a confluence of
intentions, decisions, and constraints, one of which is almost always the
eventual racial composition of districts. The goals of the redistricting process are properly the subject of policy, and constitutional, debate. Yet, as
Justice Scalia’s opinion in LULAC confirms, rigid presumptions against
race-based intentions derived from other areas of the law will often give way
to the practical realities of this special type of state action where racial considerations always lurk in the background.

